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Abstract 
The lifelogging activity 
enables a user, the 
lifelogger, to passively 
capture multimodal 
records from a first-
person perspective and 
ultimately create a 
visual diary 
encompassing every 
possible aspect of her 
life with unprecedented 
details. In recent years 
it has gained popularity 
among different groups 
of users. However, the 
possibility of ubiquitous presence of lifelogging devices 
especially in private spheres has raised serious 
concerns with respect to personal privacy. Different 
practitioners and active researchers in the field of 
lifelogging have analysed the issue of privacy in 
lifelogging and proposed different mitigation strategies. 
However, none of the existing works has considered a 
well-defined privacy threat model in the domain of 
lifelogging. Without a proper threat model, any analysis 
and discussion of privacy threats in lifelogging remains 
incomplete. In this paper we aim to fill in this gap by 
introducing a first-ever privacy threat model identifying 
several threats with respect to lifelogging. We believe 
that the introduced threat model will be an essential 
tool and will act as the basis for any further research 
within this domain. 
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Introduction 
The right to privacy is one of the fundamental human 
rights in any modern society. It advocates and 
facilitates mechanisms to uphold the privacy of all 
individuals within the society. However, what is private 
is highly debated. This is because privacy has social, 
legal, psychological, political and technical connotations 
[1]. Even more, privacy is of dynamic nature. What is 
considered private in a society can change considerably 
with time. Many of these changes are driven by 
technological advancements. 
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 One such technology is lifelogging that has further-
reaching privacy implications than any existing 
technologies. The lifelogging enables a user, the 
lifelogger, to passively capture multimodal records (e.g. 
images, videos, etc.) from a first-person perspective 
and ultimately create a visual diary encompassing 
every possible aspect of her life with unprecedented 
details. The possibility of ubiquitous presence as well as 
discreet size of many lifelogging devices especially in 
private sphere has raised serious concerns with respect 
to personal privacy. 
Understandably there is an urge to understand the 
privacy implications, in the form of privacy threats, of 
such a ubiquitous technology. Different practitioners 
and researchers have explored different ways to 
propose, design and develop different frameworks to 
mitigate the identified threats. However, none of the 
existing works has considered a threat model of privacy 
in lifelogging. Without such a model, it is difficult to 
understand, identify, assess and address the risk of 
privacy threats comprehensively. 
In this paper, we aim to fill in this gap by introducing a 
first-ever privacy threat model in lifelogging using a 
systematic approach. At first, we present a brief 
analysis on different aspects of lifelogging. Next, we 
examine different aspects of privacy and its associated 
dimensions in order to formulate a definition of privacy 
with respect to lifelogging. Then, we present our threat 
model along with the identified assets and their 
associated threats. Finally, the inter-relation between 
the identified threats and other aspects of lifelogging is 
presented. 
Lifelogging 
In general, lifelogging is a solipsistic activity that 
utilises pervasive computing technologies to capture 
the first-person view of the daily activities of a user in 
an automatic and continuous fashion. The main 
motivation for any user to engage in lifelogging is to 
create a digital representation of her daily experience 
that can be stored in a preferred storage medium for 
future recollecting, reminiscing, retrieving, reflecting, 
and remembering intentions [2] and/or for other 
purposes. To better understand and study the privacy 
implications in lifelogging, at first, we need to define 
the notion of lifelogging and study its different aspects. 
Lifelogging is the process of creating a lifelog. There are 
several definitions in the existing literature. A couple of 
such definitions are provided in the sidebar. Between 
these definitions, we prefer the definition by Gurrin et 
al. as it is more expressive. Even so, this definition has 
shortcomings. For example, a lifelog has been defined 
as a permanent and private multimedia record. We 
argue that providing a user with the capability to store 
massive amount of digital data at an ever-decreasing 
cost not necessarily guarantees the permanent storage 
of such data, since this completely depends on the 
reliability of the storage medium as well as the 
willingness of a lifelogger. Similarly, we argue that 
many users would be willing to share their lifelogs in 
social networks if there is a technical capability to do 
so. Hence, a lifelog is not completely private. To rectify 
the stated shortcomings, we propose a revised 
definition, based on the definition of Gurrin et al., 
where our revised connotations are highlighted in bold.  
Definition 1. A lifelog is a form of pervasive computing 
which utilises software and sensors to generate a 
Lifelog definitions: 
By Dodge et al.: A lifelog is 
defined “as a form of 
pervasive computing 
consisting of a unified digital 
record of the totality of an 
individual's experiences, 
captured multi-modally 
through digital sensors and 
stored permanently as a 
personal multimedia archive” 
[3]. 
By Gurrin et al.: A lifelog has 
been defined as "a form of 
pervasive computing which 
utilises software and sensors 
to generate a permanent, 
private and unified 
multimedia record of the 
totality of an individual's life 
experience and makes it 
available in a secure and 
pervasive manner". 
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 (potentially) permanent, private yet (potentially) 
shareable and unified multimedia record of the totality 
of an individual’s life experience and makes it available 
in a secure, privacy-friendly and pervasive manner. 
Actors in lifelogging are the involved entities during 
lifelogging. Gurrin et al. identified four different actors 
[1] presented in the sidebar.  
Privacy in Lifelogging 
What is the most appropriate definition of Privacy is 
highly debated. This is because privacy has social, 
legal, psychological, political and technical connotations 
[1]. A complex entanglement of these connotations 
dictates what can be considered private in a society. 
Interestingly, what is considered private in a period of 
time may not be considered as a private in another 
period. The involvement of such different perspectives 
and their highly volatile dynamic nature make it harder 
to define a one-size-fits-all definition of privacy. Hence, 
there exist a number of definitions of privacy from 
different perspectives and from different time periods. 
Next, we explore a few influential definitions of privacy 
and analyse their relevance and suitability in terms of 
lifelogging. 
Motivated with the availability and popularity of modern 
photography and printing press and their implications 
on the privacy of people, Samuel Warren and Louis 
Brandeis wrote the seminal, influential paper The Right 
to Privacy in which they defined privacy as: “the right 
to be alone” [4]. It is thought to be the first definition 
of privacy [1] and devised with the motivation to 
protect people from nosy reporters who would take 
their photographs without their consent [5]. 
Unfortunately, this definition has lost its effectiveness 
in the modern day society where taking photographs of 
other people in public places is no longer considered a 
breach of privacy of those people, legally as well as 
socially. This notion of privacy is all about capturing the 
one's right to be in solitude and to protect the person 
from intrusion in a physical domain. Hence, it is viewed 
as the privacy of personal sphere [6]. 
With the popularities of computers and computing 
systems and the possibilities of storing large amount of 
personal data into these systems and the capability of 
advanced data processing mechanisms, a new notion of 
privacy, called Information Privacy, in the domain of 
technology started to gain attention from 1960s 
onward. In this regard, one of the most influential 
definitions of privacy was given by Alan Westin in [7] 
where privacy was defined as: “the right to select what 
personal information about me is known to what 
people”. 
Next, we explore how the concept of privacy is applied 
in the physical world using the concept of privacy 
dimensions. Privacy dimensions denote the different 
modes of privacy. Based on the four modes (Solitude, 
Intimacy, Anonymity and Reserve) of privacy 
introduced by Westin in [7], Pedersen conducted an 
empirical study and identified six dimensions of privacy 
in the social setting [8]. The dimensions are presented 
in the sidebar of the next page. 
These six modes altogether define different aspects of 
privacy of a person in the social setting. Ensuring the 
gratification of these aspects can enable the right for a 
person to be private according to her needs. This is 
facilitated by social norms and legal practices. These 
social norms and practices draw a line, often imaginary, 
Lifelogging actors: 
The Lifelogger. A lifelogger 
is the entity which utilises a 
lifelogging device to capture 
and store lifelogs. Here, we 
assume that a lifelogger is a 
person. 
The Bystander. A bystander 
is any person who is captured 
(intentionally, incidentally or 
accidentally) in a lifelog of 
another person (lifelogger) 
without engaging in 
interactions with the 
lifelogger. Examples of 
bystanders are strangers in 
an environment, family 
members, friends, 
colleagues, etc. 
The Subject. A subject is 
any person who is captured 
(intentionally or incidentally) 
in a lifelog of the lifelogger 
during their interaction. 
The Host. A host is the 
entity who bears the 
responsibility of storing a 
lifelog of a lifelogger.  
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 between what is private and what is public. However, 
advocates of personal privacy have witnessed a tension 
or even a threat to this imaginary line with the advent 
of modern technologies allowing devices, especially 
cameras, camcorders, mobile phones and tablets, to 
blur the distinction between what is private and public. 
Defining Privacy in Lifelogging 
To define privacy with respect to lifelogging, we, at 
first, analyse the only one definition in the existing 
literature presented by Gurrin et al. [1] in which 
privacy in lifelogging has been defined as the “the right 
to choose the composition and the usage of your lifelog 
and the right to choose what happens to your 
representation in the lifelogs of others”. 
This is a simple literal definition that captures the 
notion of user empowerment (especially data control) 
by enabling the lifelogger to capture a lifelog and the 
other actors (the subject and bystander) with the right 
to dictate what to do with the lifelogs in which they 
appear. However, this definition fails to capture other 
privacy dimensions. Based on this definition, we have 
formulated an elaborate definition of privacy in 
lifelogging that captures all dimensions of privacy in a 
physical world. The definition is presented below. 
Definition 2. Privacy of captured lifelogs in an 
information system is the right to exercise anonymity 
when desired by any involved actors (lifeloggers, 
bystanders and subjects) as well as to empower each 
respective actor with  the required capability to exert 
privacy considering all (appropriate) dimensions while 
the lifelogs are stored in a storage medium, processed 
in a system, visualised in an interface and (optionally) 
shared among different users. 
Threat Modelling in Lifelogging 
Threat modelling is an integrated process of designing 
and developing a secure and privacy-friendly system. A 
well-defined threat model helps to identify security and 
privacy threats on different assets of a system. In 
essence, a threat modelling consists of the following 
steps [9, 10, 11]: 
 listing assets of the system and 
 identifying possible security and privacy threats 
on those assets. 
Each single step of the threat modelling process is 
described in the following sub-sections. 
Listing assets 
An asset is the abstract or physical resource in an 
information system that needs to be protected from an 
adversary (attacker) [9]. It is the resource for which a 
threat exists and represents the target of the adversary 
in the system. The motivation behind this step is to 
highlight such assets in the system. The corresponding 
assets of a lifelogging system is presented in the 
sidebar of the next page.  
Identifying Threats 
A threat represents the activity or capability of an 
adversary onto an asset of a system with an intention 
to invade the security of the system or invade the 
privacy of a user in the system [9]. The main 
motivation behind this step is to identity possible 
threats on different assets of the system. Based on the 
threat modelling process presented in [11], we identify 
the following threats: 
Privacy dimensions: 
Reserve. This represents the 
unwillingness of a person to 
be with and to interact with 
others, especially strangers. 
Isolation. This represents 
the desire of a person “to be 
alone and away from others”. 
Solitude. This represents the 
state of a person when she is 
“alone by oneself and free 
from observations by others”. 
Intimacy with Family. This 
represents the state of a 
person being alone with 
members of the person's 
family.  
Intimacy with Friends. This 
represents the state of a 
person being alone with her 
friends.  
Anonymity. This represents 
the expectation of a person 
not being recognised or to 
remain unnoticed in a crowd 
and hence “not wishing to be 
the centre of group 
attention”.  
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 T1: Unnoticed Capture. A lifelogging device can be 
quite discreet in nature. This will allow a lifelogger to 
carry on the unnoticed capture of lifelogs in which other 
actors may appear even without their knowledge 
and/or consent. 
T2: Unaware Identification and unforeseen 
inference. An attacker can identify a person using a 
lifelog and ever-powerful image search online services. 
Combining the identity of the person with other meta-
information (especially gps coordinates) embedded 
inside a lifelog the attacker can create a profile of the 
person without theirr knowledge. Such profile can be 
used to create inference for future occurrence of events 
which otherwise were not possible. 
T3: Lack of control. Many lifelogging devices (e.g. 
Narrative Clip) require the lifelogger to upload data in a 
cloud server maintained by the manufacturer even 
before the lifelogs are accessible to the lifelogger. Once 
lifelogs are uploaded to the server, the lifelogger has 
limited control over them and may not be aware how 
such lifelogs are being abused by the manufacturer. 
The very nature of the lifelogging makes it very difficult 
for other actors such as subjects or bystanders to 
express their consent explicitly while lifelogs are 
captured, stored and analysed n a system. 
T4: Inaccessibility of lifelogs. Lifelogs are 
inaccessible to subjects and bystanders until they are 
shared by the lifelogger.  
T5: Determining sensitivity. Sensitivity in a lifelog 
will determine if the lifelog can be considered private. 
For example, a lifelog captured in a private and/or 
intimate setting can be considered as of highly 
sensitive. Technically, lifelogs are created in large 
volume. For example, modern lifelogging devices such 
Narrative Clip allow capturing nearly 3000 lifelogs each 
day. This sheer volume of lifelogs makes it extremely 
difficult even for the lifelogger to pinpoint each 
sensitive lifelog.  
T6: Security. There is a strong inter-relationship 
between security and privacy. In many ways, different 
security measures safeguard the privacy of users in an 
information system. The threats related to security are 
presented below. 
 T6.1: Secure storage. The information 
system should take great care to securely store 
the captured lifelogs so that attackers cannot 
access them inappropriately. 
 T6.2: Confidentiality and integrity. An 
attacker can intercept shared lifelogs while 
being transmitted, allowing the attacker to get 
hold of lifelogs in an unauthorised fashion and 
may alter a lifelog before they are transmitted 
to the destination system. 
 T6.3: Unauthorised disclosure. Lifelogs are 
disclosed to another unauthenticated and/or 
unauthorised user allowing the second user to 
get hold of such lifelogs inappropriately.  
Some threats are applicable to all actors whereas 
others apply to a specific actor. For example, the 
dimension of Solitude is not applicable to a subject and 
a bystander since, otherwise, they would not appear in 
a lifelog. Similarly, the dimensions of Reserve and 
Isolation are not applicable to a subject. By combining 
these two arguments, we summarise which threats are 
Identified assets: 
Lifelogs.  In a lifelogging 
system, the lifelogs are the 
core assets since the main 
purpose of such a system is 
to deal with captured lifelogs. 
Identity of a user. The 
identity of a user is defined 
as a representation of the 
user in a specific application 
domain [12]. Since lifelogs 
can be used to identify users, 
the identity of a user is also a 
crucial asset. 
Information embedded 
within a lifelog. Meta-
information (e.g. gps 
coordinates) within each 
lifelog represents a valuable 
asset as it can abused to 
infer unforeseen knowledge 
about a user. 
Access control 
mechanisms. The deployed 
access control mechanisms 
determine which lifelog is 
exposed to which user(s) and 
thus, can be regarded as a 
crucial asset. 
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 applicable within which dimensions for which actor in 
Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3. In these tables, R 
represents the Reserve dimension whereas I, S, FM, FR 
and A represent Intimacy, Solitude, Intimacy with 
family, Intimacy with friends and Anonymity 
respectively. To indicate a threat is applicable to a 
particular dimension with respect to an actor, “√” 
symbol has been used whereas “-” indicates the 
particular threat does not apply for the corresponding 
dimension with respect to an actor. 
Conclusions 
The motivation of this paper is to identify potential 
privacy threats and then analyse their implications on 
different aspects of lifelogging. Being a nascent 
technology, it is still not clear how the lifelogging 
technology will be shaped and what privacy implications 
it will expose in future. One thing is certain that there 
will be many more interesting use-cases of lifelogging 
apart from being a tool of personal recollection and 
ramification. As such, it has the potential to gain 
mainstream traction just like photography. To realise 
this potentiality, privacy threats need to be identified 
and addressed. This paper aims to meet these goals 
and lay out the foundation for subsequent research to 
design and develop a privacy-preserving lifelogging 
system. 
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  Lifelogger 
R I S FM FR A 
T-1 - - - - - - 
T-2 - - - - - - 
T-3 √ √ √ √ √ √ 
T-4 - - - - - - 
T-5 √ √ √ √ √ √ 
T6.1 √ √ √ √ √ √ 
T6.2 √ √ √ √ √ √ 
T6.3 √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Table 1: Threats for lifeloggers 
 Bystander 
R I S FM FR A 
T-1 √ √ - √ √ √ 
T-2 √ √ - √ √ √ 
T-3 √ √ - √ √ √ 
T-4 √ √ - √ √ √ 
T-5 √ √ - √ √ √ 
T6.1 - - - - - - 
T6.2 √ √ - √ √ √ 
T6.3 √ √ - √ √ √ 
Table 2: Threats for bystanders 
 Subject 
R I S FM FR A 
T-1 - - - √ √ √ 
T-2 - - - √ √ √ 
T-3 - - - √ √ √ 
T-4 - - - √ √ √ 
T-5 - - - √ √ √ 
T6.1 - - - - - - 
T6.2 - - - √ √ √ 
T6.3 - - - √ √ √ 
Table 3: Threats for subjects 
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